In Emergency Situations
04 Feb, 2025

According to sector organizations such as BIMCO, ICS, CLIA, IMCA, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, IMCA, and OCIMF, temporary transit advice has been reissued for vessels sailing in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden due to the security threats against commercial vessels in the region.

This guide was published following a series of attacks on international maritime transport by Houthi forces and highlights the threat of navigation near Yemen’s Red Sea coastline.

The Houthis claim to target vessels they believe are directly connected to Israel, Israeli citizens, or the Saudi-led coalition involved in the conflict with the Houthi rebels. However, recent attacks on vessels do not show any direct connection to Israel, Israeli citizens, or the conflict.

Since the source of the Houthis’ information and its accuracy are unknown, vessels passing through the region should remain aware of potential secondary damage and avoid altering their routes based on Houthi demands.

In the past, Houthi forces have used anti-ship missiles, waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack vessels. Additionally, they have planted mines around port entrances under their control, and occasionally these mines have drifted from their moorings and been carried into shipping lanes.

The threat from airborne activities is likely higher during daylight hours when targets are easier to detect and attack. However, there continues to be difficulty in visually detecting and classifying small night-time contacts, such as those from waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs).

The industry’s advice on using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) remains unchanged in light of the recent attacks.
https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2017/09/06/guidance-on-maritime-security-transit-corridor/

Additionally, vessels operating in this area are strongly advised to exercise extreme caution and follow the measures below to ensure their safe and secure passage:

Before entering the region, conduct a vessel- and voyage-specific risk assessment, considering factors such as safe speed, night/day transits, and bridge personnel levels.

• If armed guards are to be used for the voyage, their employment should be approached carefully, and engagement rules should consider the risk of escalation.

• Vessels with AIS off and on have been attacked. While turning off AIS makes it marginally harder to track a vessel, it also prevents the military from offering support or establishing direct contact. IMO Circular A1106(29) paragraph 22 summarizes AIS use. According to it, “The master may turn off AIS if they believe continuous operation of AIS endangers the safety and security of the vessel or if security incidents are imminent.” Limiting AIS data or turning off AIS may make it more difficult to pinpoint the vessel’s location, but it is unlikely to prevent an attack.

• Hardening measures as outlined in Best Management Practices (BMP5) can be applied in areas where armed boarding by helicopters is a possible threat. The use of citadels/safe areas has proven effective in preventing pirates from taking control of vessels.

• Refer to the Maritime Global Security website, OCIMF’s vessel security vulnerability study, and the latest U.S. Maritime Advisory for the region.

• Register the vessel’s transit on the MSCHOA website and report any suspicious activity or concerns to UKMTO.

• Refer to the guidance provided by the Flag State and ensure that ISPS security levels are appropriately followed.

• In the event of an attack, please contact the U.S. Navy in Bahrain directly at +973 1785 3879.

Should you have any questions regarding this newsletter, please contact us 24/7 using the contact details below.

Kind regards,

Esenyel Partners | Security Threat to Commercial Ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
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